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Introduction
The immigration statutes authorize the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) to submit classified information regarding an alien's involvement with terrorism to an immigration judge, in particular contexts during
removal proceedings, without showing that evidence to the alien. The
introduction of such "undisclosed" evidence obviously flouts traditional
notions of procedural due process based on the adversarial system. Without access to the classified information, the alien does not know the full
nature of the government's case and cannot present counterarguments.
The debate over the use of undisclosed evidence has tended toward
extremes, with the government simply contending that constitutional procedural due process does not apply. The critics, on the other hand, argue
that the introduction of undisclosed evidence violates the most basic
norms of due process, that it perpetuates the sub-constitutional status of
immigration law, and that it reflects prejudice toward Arabs and Moslems.
This polarization directs attention away from the possibility of counterbalancing, even if only partially, the loss of certain traditional attributes of
adversarial due process, with other, less conventional, measures designed
to reduce the risk of error. This essay advances such a compromise,
allowing the INS to introduce into evidence classified information disclosed only to an immigration judge while still providing a measure of
meaningful procedural due process protection for the alien.
t Assistant Professor, University of Mississippi School of Law. Before joining the
faculty at the University of Mississippi, Professor Hall worked at the Department of
Justice in the Civil Division's Office of Immigration Litigation on a team of attorneys
handling immigration matters related to national security and counter-terrorism. The
opinions expressed in this article, however, are those of Professor Hall alone.
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In short, this essay articulates a formal understanding of the immigration judge's role when presented with classified information. The starting
point lies with the proposition that, independent of any constitutional
requirement of procedural due process, the statutory scheme requires the
immigration judge to conduct a fair hearing. Because the immigration
judge must abide by the congressional directive to allow classified evidence, it follows that the immigration courts must develop some understanding of what it means to admit classified information into evidence
fairly. This essay proposes that an immigration judge confronted with classified evidence should assume an inquisitorial, rather than adjudicative,
role. The immigration judge should probe the INS' submission under rigorous evidentiary standards, admitting only those pieces of evidence that
bear sufficient indicia of reliability. Although the reliability determination
would not rest on the adversarial process, neither would the alien lack any
formal procedural protection regarding the admission of classified
evidence.
Two dramatic consequences flow from this understanding of the
proper role of the immigration judge. First, the debate over classified evidence would lose its all-or-nothing character. Even a victory for the government would not deprive the alien of all formal procedural protection. Nor
would the alien receive some measure of procedural protection only by
forcing the government to either declassify its evidence or abandon the
matter. Second, should a reviewing federal court find that constitutional
procedural due process did apply to the introduction of classified information, it would be able to analyze a formal set of procedural safeguardsrather than just the ad hoc decisions of a particular immigration judge-to
determine whether the process met with the requirements of flexible due
process.
Although the future of classified information in immigration proceedings remains unclear, 1 the dilemma posed by the executive branch's desire
1. For example, during the second presidential debate with Al Gore, candidate
George Bush appeared to condemn the use of classified evidence as a form of racial
profiling by stating, "Arab-Americans are racially profiled in what's called secret evidence. People are stopped, and we got to do something about that." Anne Gearan, ABA
May Back Immigration Law Changes, AP Online, Feb. 16, 2001, available at 2001 WL
13673650. During 2000, Congress debated repealing significant portions of the classified evidence provisions. See id. Attorney General Ashcroft in congressional testimony
on the status of classified evidence characterized the President as having "expressed his
disapproval" and, indicated, prior to September 11, 2001, that the Administration had
not taken a position on the use of classified evidence. Stephen Franklin & Ken Armstrong, Secret evidence bill raises concerns; Often abused, laws called 'poisonous', CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 30, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WL 4120392.
Furthermore, even if the Bush Administration uses classified information in immigration proceedings, because of the closure of immigration proceedings involving matters
related to the war on terrorism, the practice may not receive the scrutiny it did before
September 11, 2001. See NorthJersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 220
(3d Cir. 2002) (holding the immigration courts may not close proceedings involving
counter-terrorism matters). But see Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 709-10
(6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the immigration courts may not close proceedings involving counter-terrorism matters). In other words, because the Administration is con-
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to use classified information in adjudications extends beyond the immigration sphere. Recently, because of the war on terrorism, proposals have
emerged for the use of undisclosed evidence in military tribunals 2 and in
judicial review of the designation of United States citizens as enemy combatants. 3 In other words, the problem delineated in this essay echoes
broadly, and perhaps the compromise offered here for immigration proceedings could find some usefulness in these other contexts.
This essay will proceed by first examining the various uses of undisclosed evidence in immigration proceedings. Next, it will describe the
polarization of the debate over undisclosed evidence and will illuminate
the inability of such a polemic to adequately address or balance the legitimate concerns of each side. The essay will then offer a possibility for
resolving the tension by altering the role of the immigration judge in proceedings involving undisclosed evidence in order to diminish the possibility of an erroneous decision. Finally, the essay will conclude by critiquing
the wisdom of the proposed solution.
I.

Undisclosed Classified Evidence in Immigration Proceedings

The immigration statutes expressly authorize the use of undisclosed, classified evidence detailing an alien's involvement with terrorism in three distinct contexts: (1) during an expedited removal proceeding of an
inadmissible arriving alien, 4 (2) during a removal proceeding before the
Alien Terrorist Removal Court ("ATRC"), 5 and (3) during an immigration
judge's consideration of an alien's application for discretionary relief.6 The
expedited removal procedures and the ATRC expressly limit the consideration of classified information to an inquiry on whether the alien is removable because of involvement with terrorism or because the alien poses a
national security threat. 7 While the discretionary application provision
ducting many immigration proceedings in secret, we simply may not know the current
extent, if any, of the use of classified information.
2. See Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1, Procedures for
Trials of certain Non-United States Citizens in the War on Terrorism, § 6(B)(3) (Mar. 21,
2002) (authorizing the military commission to close proceedings and consider information presented ex parte and in camera by the prosecution, without the presence of the
accused, although with the presence of the appointed defense counsel, who may not
disclose any secret information presented in such closed session).
3. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting the
government's interest in submitting an ex parte supplement detailing procedures
employed for the designation of Hamdi as an enemy combatant); Padilla ex rel. Newman
v. Bush, 233 F.Supp.2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (describing the government's submission of
a sealed declaration detailing the procedures employed for the designation of Padilla as
an enemy combatant but declining to consider the document considering the stage of
the proceedings). But cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, _F.3d __, 2003 WL 60109, *11-13
(4th Cir. Jan. 8, 2003) (holding that a declaration by an official at the Department of
Defense adequately supported Hamdi's designation as an enemy combatant).
4. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 235(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c)(2000).
5. See INA §§ 501-07, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-37 (2000).
6. See INA § 240(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2000).
7. See INA § 235(c)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c)(2)(B)(i) (2000) (authorizing expedited removal for an arriving alien inadmissible on the certain national security and

Cornell International Law Journal

Vol. 35

does not contain such an explicit directive, the main forms of discretionary
relief all contain eligibility bars based on an alien's involvement in terrorism or status as a national security threat.8
Because the use of classified evidence in expedited removal procedures generally stands on firm constitutional ground 9 and because the
executive branch has never employed the ATRC, this essay focuses on the
use of undisclosed information to defeat an application for discretionary
relief. Nevertheless, an analysis of the adequacy of the proposed new role
for the immigration judge depends upon an understanding of the procedures applicable to each use of classified information.
In the case of classified information introduced during expedited
removal proceedings, the statutes and regulations provide minimal procedural protection-indeed, this process has been described as "summary"
exclusion. '0 Foremost, the determination of removability rests not with an
immigration judge, but with a Regional Director of the INS. I I Although the
alien may submit a statement, or information, to the INS official,' 2 the
statute does not contemplate any sort of hearing, does not explicate the
nature of the evidentiary or deliberative process, and does not provide the
alien with notice of particular allegations. Nor does the statute articulate a
terrorism grounds specified in INA § 212(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) (2000)); INA
§ 504(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1534(g) (2000) (authorizing removal based on proof that the alien
is a terrorist).
8. See INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(iv) & (v), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iv) & (v) (2000)
(containing a bar on asylum for aliens involved in terrorism or posing a threat to
national security); INA § 240A(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c)(4) (2000) (same for cancellation of removal and adjustment of status); INA § 240B(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229c(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C) (2000) (same for voluntary departure); INA
§ 241(b)(3)(B)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv) (2000) (same for withholding of
removal).
Although the INS regulations contemplate the use of classified information to defeat
an application for withholding of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 240.1 1(c)(iv) (2001), that form
of relief is often described as mandatory rather than discretionary. See INA
§ 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2000) (prohibiting the Attorney General from
removing certain aliens, rather than granting the Attorney General the authority to elect
whether to remove them or not); see also McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir.
1981) (describing the evolution of the mandatory withholding provision). Accordingly,
withholding may not constitute a form of relief falling under the ambit of the classified
evidence statute.
In addition to the dispute over withholding, there is also a conflict over whether classified evidence may be introduced on consideration of an alien's request for release from
detention on bond without violating constitutional due process. Compare Barbour v.
Dist. Director, 491 F.2d 573, 577-78 (5th Cir. 1974) (allowing the use of classified
evidence) with al Najjar v. Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1350-57 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (finding the use of classified evidence violated constitutional rights) and Kiareldeen v. Reno,
71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413-15 (D.NJ. 1999).
9. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213-14 (1953);
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950). But see Rafeedie
v. INS, 880 F.2d. 506, 521-25 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding expedited removal proceedings
unconstitutional as applied to a lawful permanent resident, but leaving open the possibility that additional procedures might provide adequate process).
10. See Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 515.
11. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.8(b) (2001).
12. See INA § 235(c)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c)(3) (2000).
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clear standard of proof. Instead, it merely provides that the INS official
may order the removal of the alien if he is "satisfied on the basis of confidential information" that the alien falls under the inadmissibility provision
for national security threats and aliens involved in terrorism.' 3 Generally,
14
however, an arriving alien bears the burden of proving admissibility.
The ATRC, on the other hand, establishes procedures falling short of
the full and open adversarial process obtained in a normal removal hearing, but far more advanced and detailed than those just described. Moreover, the ATRC accords the alien several rights absent in normal removal
hearings. The ATRC is an Article III court. 5 The government must submit an ex parte and in camera request for a removal hearing to a judge,
who may either deny the request and end the process, or approve the
request and convene the hearing.' 6 In contrast, the INS initiates a removal
17
hearing simply by filing a notice to appear with the Immigration Court.
At the ATRC hearing, the alien benefits from the right to appointed counsel
at public expense if necessary,' 8 whereas in a normal removal hearing, the
alien has only the right to have counsel present if the alien can obtain
counsel on his or her own. 19
The ATRC procedures accord the alien a summary of the classified
evidence sufficient to allow the alien to prepare a defense; if after two
attempts the government fails to craft a satisfactory document, the judge
waives such a summary on the grounds that the alien poses a pronounced
danger and a detailed summary would cause serious harm to the United
States. 20 If the alien receives no summary, and is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, the alien has the right to a special attorney
appointed by the court to inspect and challenge the classified evidence on
the alien's behalf-although the attorney may not disclose the evidence to
the alien. 2 1 In any event, the ATRC procedures require the government to
prove removability by a preponderance of the evidence, 22 in contrast to the
government's clear and convincing burden in a removal hearing based on a
charge of deportability, 23 and the alien's burden to prove admissibility
24
clearly and beyond doubt in a removal hearing based on admissibility.
Notably, the statute expressly disclaims the application of the Federal
13. See INA § 235(c)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c)(2)(B)(i) (2000).
14. 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(d) (2001) ("Each alien seeking admission ... shall establish to
the satisfaction of the immigration officer that he or she is not subject to removal under
the immigration laws.").
15. See INA § 502(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1532(a) (2000).
16. See INA § 503(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1533(a)-(c) (2000).
17. See 8 C.F.R. § 239.1(a) (2001) ("Every removal proceeding conducted under section 240 of the Act to determine the deportability or inadmissibility of an alien is commenced by the filing of a notice to appear with the Immigration Court.").
18. See INA § 504(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1534(c)(1) (2000).
19. See INA § 240(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2000).
20. See INA § 504(e)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3) (2000).
21. See INA § 504(e)(3)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(F) (2000).
22. See INA § 504(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1534(g) (2000).
23. See INA § 240(c)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2000).
24. See INA § 240(c)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A) (2000).
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Rules of Evidence in proceedings before the ATRC. 25
In contrast to the treatment of classified information during an expedited removal proceeding conducted by an INS official or during an ATRC
hearing before a federal judge, when the government introduces classified
information to defeat an application for discretionary relief, an immigration judge considers the matter as part of an otherwise traditional removal
proceeding. Moreover, the statutory and regulatory provisions describe an
intermediate level of procedures attending the proffer of such evidence.
Specifically, the immigration court appears to have some gatekeeping
26
If
authority to determine whether the classified information is relevant.
it is found relevant, the immigration judge informs the alien of the proffer
of classified information. 2 7 If the application in question concerns asylum, the alien receives an unclassified summary of the classified information from the classifying agency only if the agency determines that it can
issue the summary "consistently with safeguarding both the classified
nature of the information and its sources. '' 28 If the application concerns
adjustment of status, the immigration judge makes the determination of
whether such a summary is possible. 29 In any event, the regulations provide that "[t]he summary should be as detailed as possible, in order that
the alien may have an opportunity to offer opposing evidence."'30 Beyond
these minimal protections, the alien has no access to the classified information 3 ' and has only those rights otherwise accorded during removal proceedings. In other words, the alien possesses a right to counsel, but not to
appointed counsel.3 2 The alien bears the burden of establishing eligibility
for any discretionary relief and that such relief should be granted as a matter of discretion. 33 Further, if the evidence indicates that a ground for
mandatory denial of an application for discretionary relief applies-such as
the alien's involvement with terrorism or the alien's threat to national
security-then the alien must refute that evidence and prove by a prepon34
derance of the evidence that no such bar applies.

25. See INA § 504(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1534(h) (2000).
26. See 8 C.F.R. § 240.1l(a)(3) (2001) (governing applications for adjustment of status and providing for the consideration of classified information if the immigration
judge determines that such information is "relevant"); 8 C.F.R. § 240(b)(3)(iv) (2001)
(governing applications for asylum and authorizing the immigration judge or the Board
of Immigration Appeals to determine the relevancy of any proffered classified evidence).
27. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 240.11(a)(2), 240(b)(3)(iv) (2000).

28. 8 C.F.R. § 240.11(b)(3)(iv) (2000).
29. See 8 C.F.R. § 240.11(a)(3) (2000).
30. 8 C.F.R. § 240.11(b)(3)(iv); see id. ("Itihe immigration judge should inform the
alien of the general nature of the information in order that the alien may have an opportunity to offer opposing evidence").
31. See INA § 240(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2000).
32. See INA § 240(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2002).
33. See 8 C.F.R. § 240.8(d) (2001).
34. See id.
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The Polarized Debate over Undisclosed Classified Evidence

The government defends the use of classified evidence to defeat applications for discretionary relief by noting that the Supreme Court approved of
the practice in Jay v. Boyd.3 5 The government's defense continues by focusing its case on the lack of any liberty or property interest triggering a constitutional right to procedural due process. 36 In other words, the
government contends that the alien possesses no stake in the outcome of
any application for discretionary relief from removal because the executive
37
branch distributes those benefits as a matter of sovereign grace if at all.
Accordingly, aliens have no right to procedural due process in an application for discretionary relief because they would suffer no deprivation upon
the denial of the application. Phrased differently, even if one treated the
loss of the opportunity to apply and establish eligibility as a deprivation,
the alien has no reasonable expectation to the receipt of discretionary
38
relief.
Opponents of the use of classified evidence object on several
grounds. 3 9 First, they note that Jay resolved only a dispute over the statutory permissibility of classified evidence. 40 Second, the critics contend,
the Court's seeming approval of the constitutionality of classified evidence
constitutes mere dicta.4 1 Third, the critics note that, even under the government's interpretation of Jay, the use of classified evidence to defeat certain
forms of mandatory relief from removal, such as withholding of removal,
would not be authorized by statute or precedent. 4 2 Finally, the critics
point to Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,4 3 rather than Jay, as the relevant precedent.4 4 Although Colding arose in the context of an expedited removal proceeding, the Court held that procedural due process prevented the use of
35. 351 U.S. 345, 352-59 & n.21 (1956).
36. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).
37. See, e.g., Jay, 351 U.S. at 354 (stating, with regard to discretionary relief from
deportation, that "a grant thereof is manifestly not a matter of right under any circumstances"); INS v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 30 (1996) (describing discretionary relief from
deportation as an "act of grace" akin to a presidential pardon because it involves "unfettered discretion").
38. Cf. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (eliminating the rights versus privileges distinction as
the determinant for whether procedural due process exists and replacing that wooden
doctrine with the test of whether a person has a reasonable expectation to the continued
receipt of the benefit).
39. For strong arguments against the use of classified evidence in immigration proceedings dealing with discretionary relief, see generally Susan M. Akram, Scheherezade
Meets Kafka: Two Dozen Sordid Tales of Ideological Exclusion, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 51
(1999); David Cole, Secrecy, Guilt by Association, and the Terrorist Profile, 15 J.L. &
RELIGION 267 (2000-01); D. Mark Jackson, Exposing Secret Evidence: Eliminating a New
Hardship of United States Immigration Policy, 19 BUFF. PUB. INTEREST ].J. 25 (2000-01);
Kelley Brooke Snyder, Note, A Clash of Values: Classified Information in Immigration Proceedings, 88 VA. L. REv. 447 (2002).
40. See Jay, 351 U.S. at 357-59.
41. See Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 410-11 (D.N.J. 1999).
42. See supra discussion in note 8.
43. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
44. See Kiareldeen, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 409.
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classified evidence against a resident alien. 45 Indeed, the Court stated that
although Congress could "prescribe conditions" for an alien's "expulsion
and deportation, not even Congress may expel him without allowing him a
fair opportunity to be heard."'4 6 The critics then attack the notion that the
use of undisclosed classified evidence could ever conform to even the most
rudimentary standards of procedural due process. 4 7 As the Supreme
Court stated in Greene v. McElroy:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence.
One of these is that where government action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed48to the
individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue.
The critics of classified evidence also inveigh against the procedure
both as ripe for ideological abuse and as a breeding ground for racial, religious, and national prejudice. 4 9 These charges flow from the Cold War history of the practice of using classified evidence, its predominant use
against Arabs and Moslems accused of involvement with terrorism, 50 and
the statutory provisions that allow classified evidence to disqualify an alien
from relief based on associational relationships or expressive conduct relat51
ing to a group that espouses terrorism.
For the purposes of this essay, the import of the debate lies not in the
analysis of which side presents the superior claim, but instead in the recog45. Colding, 344 U.S. at 595-98.
46. Id. at 579-98.
47. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1069
(9th Cir. 1995).
48. 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959); see also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("democracy implies respect for
the elementary rights of men ...[and] must therefore practice fairness; and fairness can
rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of the facts decisive of rights");
Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("It is therefore the firmly
held main rule that a court may not dispose of the merits of a case on the basis of ex
parte, in camera submissions.").
49. See, e.g., Akram, supra note 39, at 53 ("Using secret evidence to deport Arabs and
Muslims appears to be the latest manifestation of a war waged by various government
agencies against these ethnic and religious groups; a war waged ostensibly to combat
'terrorism,' but which raises the disturbing specter of ideological bias.").
50. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 39, at 268 ("For the last decade, virtually all of the
INS's targets for these tactics-secret evidence and guilt by association-have been Arabs
or Muslims."); id. at 283 ("The constitutional prohibition on guilt by association
problems developed in response to McCarthy era laws that penalized association with
the Communist Party.").
51. See INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)(aa), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)(aa) (West
Supp. 1992) (providing that a representative of a designated foreign terrorist group is
inadmissible), (bb) (providing that a representative of a group that publicly endorses
terrorism is inadmissible upon determination by the Secretary of State that such conduct undermines efforts to reduce terrorism); INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(V), 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(V) (West Supp. 1992) (providing that membership in a foreign terrorist organization constitutes grounds for inadmissibility); INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(Vl), 8
U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VI) (West Supp. 1992) (providing that an alien who uses his
position of prominence to endorse or espouse terrorism is inadmissible upon determination by the Secretary of State that such conduct undermines efforts to reduce terrorism).
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nition that each side presents only arguments for absolute victory. The
government wants a result that would eliminate constitutional procedural
due process from the consideration of applications for discretionary relief.
The critics of classified evidence see a foundational conflict with the due
process essentials of notice and the opportunity to be heard. Neither side
offers any arguments that would allow a decision-maker to balance or reconcile the important arguments on each side. Such a situation seems particularly vexing given our current circumstances in the war on terrorism
and the need for a simultaneous assessment of the gravity of the national
security risks we face and the consequences for liberty entailed by draconian measures designed to eliminate those risks. 5 2 Phrased differently,
before we can make a wise choice of either policy or law, we need not only
to understand the concerns at each end of the debate, but also the possibility of a compromise between those extremes.
III. A Potential Resolution of the Problem of Classified Evidence
A resolution to the problem of classified evidence is one that attempts to do
more than-simply pick a winning side; instead, a meaningful resolution is
one that balances both the government's and the critic's arguments. In
other words, a resolution must allow the government to use classified evidence, but still provide some meaningful procedural due process protection to an alien. Such a resolution depends on what constitutes
"meaningful" due process. 5 3 The modern Supreme Court's approach to

due process appears to be based on instrumentalism-the goal of due process is to ensure accuracy and consistency, and to avoid mistaken deprivations. 5 4 The parameters of due process are flexible so long as they balance
the risk of error, the interest of the individual, and the interest of the gov52. Indeed, the danger of such a polemical and polarized debate lies also in the
possibility of escalation by the executive branch. If the government perceives that its
basic national security concerns are inadequately balanced, the temptation grows to
assert that the use of classified evidence is unreviewable under the political question
doctrine. The Supreme Court has expressly left open the possibility that immigration
procedures, that otherwise violate the Constitution, might be nonjusticiable. See Fiallo
v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 793 n.5 (1977) ("there may be actions of the Congress with respect
to aliens that are so essentially political as to be nonjusticiable").
53. The Supreme Court may offer crucial guidance on constitutional procedural due
process in immigration cases when it decides the case of Demore v. Kim which concerns
the constitutionality of mandatory detention for aliens placed in removal proceedings
directly after release from their prison sentences. See Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F. 3d 523 (9th
Cir. 2001) cert. granted sub nom., Demore v. Kim, 122 S. Ct. 2696 (U.S. June 28, 2002)
(No. 01-1491).
54. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 671 (2d ed. 1988) (explaining that the Supreme Court has pursued "an almost exclusively instrumental vision in
its due process jurisprudence"). In contrast to the instrumentalist vision of procedural
due process, the intrinsic approach views process as important in and of itself. See id. at
666. The process embodies concepts of participation and the rule of law. See id. (quoting Justice Frankfurter as stating that the "validity and moral authority of a conclusion
largely depend on the mode by which it was reached .... No better instrument has been
devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of
the case against him and opportunity to meet it. Nor has a better way been found for
generating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been

Cornell International Law Journal

Vol. 35

ernment.5 5 Accordingly, a resolution to the problem of classified evidence
depends crucially on the articulation of standards guiding the immigration
judge in the admission of classified information to ensure, to the extent
possible given the national security constraints, the admission of accurate
56
evidence.
The attempt to arrive at a standard to guide the immigration judge
should begin with an examination of the current test for the admission of
evidence. Presently, immigration judges may admit evidence only if it is
probative and if its admission is fundamentally fair. 5 7 The touchstone for
fairness is the reliability and trustworthiness of the evidence. 5 8 According
to the federal courts, this standard stems directly from the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of procedural due process. 59 Furthermore, this standard
applies not just to removal hearings generally, but also to the admission of
60
evidence during the consideration of applications for discretionary relief.
Assume, however, that the government is correct and an alien possesses no liberty or property interest in an application for discretionary
relief. The government advances this argument to demonstrate the acceptability of classified evidence. In other words, the government contends that
the statute authorizing the use of classified evidence poses no constitutional due process problem. But the government proves too much if its
done."

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm., 341

U.S. at

171-72 (Frankfurter,

J.,

concurring)).
55. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). Although the Court
applied the Mathews test to immigration proceedings in Landon v. Plasensia,459 U.S. 21,
34 (1982), it is worth noting that the Court has rejected the Mathews test in areas where,
as with immigration, Congress exercises plenary power. For example, in Weiss v. United
States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994), the Court explained that judicial deference was at its
"apogee" when reviewing Congress' plenary power over the military. See id. at 177. The
Weiss Court stated that the appropriate test for due process is "whether the factors militating in favor of [additional procedures] are so extraordinarily weighty as to overcome
the balance struck by Congress." Id. at 177-78.
56. Indeed, such an approach recognizes that neither the immigration judge, nor the
Board of Immigration Appeals, possess the authority to resolve the constitutional
dilemma raised by the classified evidence statutes. See, e.g., Liu v. Waters, 55 F.3d 421,
426 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that "the BIA lacks jurisdiction to decide questions of
the constitutionality" of immigration statutes); see also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S.
361, 368 (1974) (citing cases for the general rule that the "adjudication of the constitutionality of congressional enactments is beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies") (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. See, e.g., Trias-Hernandez v. INS, 528 F.2d 366, 369 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding
that the sole test for the admission of evidence in an immigration proceeding is whether
the evidence is probative and its admission fundamentally fair); Navarrette-Navarrette v.
Landon, 223 F.2d 234, 237 (9th Cir. 1955) (stating that under less stringent rules, an
administrative tribunal may admit evidence that a court would not, but the admission of
evidence must be fair); In re Toro, 17 1. & N. Dec. 340, 343 (B.l.A. 1980) ("To be admissible in deportation proceedings, evidence must be probative and its use fundamentally
fair so as not to deprive respondents of due process of law as mandated by the fifth
amendment.").
58. See Obianuju Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 301 F.3d 116, 127 (3d Cir. 2002);
Felzcerek v. INS, 75 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1996).
59. See, e.g., Trias-Hernandez, 528 F.2d at 369; Obianuju Ezeagwuna, 301 F.3d at
127.
60. See, e.g., Obianuju Ezeagwuna, 301 F.3d at 127.
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reasoning eliminates procedural due process altogether. What standards
would guide an immigration judge considering an application for discretionary relief? Could the immigration judge act unfairly? Could the immigration judge make a biased decision? How should the immigration judge
make discretionary decisions regarding the admission of particular pieces
of evidence?
A statutory and regulatory scheme as elaborate as the one governing
removal hearings explicitly contains a myriad of specific procedural
requirements. Some of these provisions may answer the above questions.
For example, the regulations appear to resolve the question of whether bias
is permissible by directing the immigration judge to "withdraw if he or she
deems himself or herself disqualified." 6 1 In other words, rather than eliminating procedural due process altogether, the government's victory would
seem merely to eliminate constitutional due process, leaving intact numerous specific procedural safeguards in the statutes and regulations governing immigration judges and removal hearings. With constitutional due
process out of the way, Congress's decision to allow the use of undisclosed
classified evidence poses no problem. Nevertheless, even with constitutional due process out of the way, statutory and regulatory due process
remain.
In addition to the specific requirements of statutory and regulatory
due process, the immigration scheme is pregnant with the implied procedural standards directing the immigration judge's decision-making.
Although not explicit, there must be an implicit overarching statutory standard governing the immigration judge's admission of evidence. Congress
could not have intended that the immigration judge act with unbridled discretion in all matters not explicitly covered by statute or addressed by regulation. On the question of the admission of evidence, then, the normal
standard (absent explicit rules of evidence or particular countervailing reasons) would seem to be the one Congress most likely intended, even if only
implicitly. In other words, even absent constitutional due process, the test
for the admission of evidence in an immigration proceeding should be
whether the evidence is probative and its admission fundamentally fair,
with fundamental fairness turning on whether the evidence is reliable and
trustworthy. In other words, it is impossible to understand how the immigration courts could admit statutorily-authorized evidence without some
62
principle based on traditional notions of fairness.
What then should the immigration judge do when confronted with
classified information proffered into evidence-without disclosure to the
alien-by the INS? A traditional adversarial system relies on challenges by
the aggrieved party to weed out unreliable evidence. The system is bol61.

8 C.F.R. § 240.1(b) (2001).

62. Indeed, the regulation on the "Scope of Rules" may express the general principle
of fairness, even if it does not specify the standard for decisions on the admission of
evidence: "These rules are promulgated to assist in the expeditious,fair, and proper resolution of matters coming before Immigration Judges." 8 C.F.R. § 3.12 (2001) (emphasis
added).
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stered with confidence that, even if dubious evidence comes in, the factfinder will appraise its weight and credibility in light of confrontational
processes. None of these adversarial forces, however, pertain in the case of
classified evidence. Accordingly, in order to test proffered classified information for reliability and trustworthiness,
the immigration judge must step
63
outside the adversarial system.
Such a role for the immigration judge is not a creation of whole cloth.
Foremost, the statutes direct the immigration judge not only to "receive
evidence" but also to "interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien
and any witnesses. ' 64 Accordingly, the Second and Ninth Circuits have
recognized that the immigration judge has an affirmative inquisitorial
responsibility-unlike an Article III judge who acts solely as an adjudicator
and fact-finder-to establish the record. 65 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit
has underscored the particular need for the immigration judge to function
in an inquisitorial mode when the alien is unrepresented by counsel. 6 6 By
analogy, because the alien is not only unrepresented by counsel, but effectively absent from that portion of the proceeding dealing with classified
information, the immigration judge must assume an inquisitorial role.
In other words, the statutes and regulations already contemplate an
inquisitorial role for the immigration judge, and not just as an ad hoc solution to the problem of classified evidence. Beyond the general duty to
establish the record described above, the statutes and regulations give the
immigration judge the power to issue subpoenas sua sponte 6 7 and to order
the taking of depositions. 6 8 Moreover, nothing in the regulations or stat69
utes bars such a role.

Additionally, the chief immigration judge has directed the immigration courts to exercise their authority to rule on the "use, relevance, or
admissibility of classified information" in a manner that will "promote a
63. Independent of the need for a more active judicial role in classified evidence
cases, some scholars have argued that the inquisitorial system offers marked advantages,
in all cases. See generallyJohn H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure,52
U. CHi. L. REV. 823 (1985) (arguing that the non-adversarial approach to "judicialized
fact-gathering has immense advantages over traditional American practice" under the
adversarial system).
64. INA § 240(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2000).
65. See Yang v. McElroy, 277 F.3d 158, 162 & n.3 (2d Cir. 2002);Jacinto v. INS, 208
F.3d 732-34 (9th Cir. 2000).
66. See Jacinto, 208 F.3d at 732-33.
67. See INA § 240(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2000) ("The immigration judge
may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and presentation of evidence."); 8
C.F.R. § 3.35(b)(1) (2001) ("An Immigration judge may issue a subpoena on his or her
own volition .... ").
68. See 8 C.F.R. § 240.7(c) (2001) ("The immigration judge may order the taking of
depositions pursuant to § 3.35 of this chapter.").
69. The regulations confer upon the immigration judge the authority to "take any
other action consistent with applicable law and regulations as may be appropriate," 8
C.F.R. § 240.1(a)(1)(iv) (2001), and "to receive and consider material evidence, rule
upon objections, and otherwise regulate the course of the hearing," 8 C.F.R. § 240(c)
(2001) (emphasis added).
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fair and expeditious trial."70 Although this directive does not articulate the
precise standards or practice the immigration judges should adopt, it
reflects an understanding that immigration judges must make discretionary decisions regarding which pieces of classified information come into
evidence and that those decisions must be guided by a concern for
fairness.
Having established that immigration judges assume an inquisitorial
role and, in that capacity, test any proffered classified information to determine its reliability and trustworthiness before accepting it into evidence, it
remains to describe how this process might work in practice and to elucidate the standards that might be necessary to give teeth to the testing process. This practical understanding must address the assertions of the
critics of classified information that the INS often proffers no more than
double or triple hearsay statements by FBI agents, rather than original
declarants.
Imagine, as an example, an alien who has overstayed his visa, is placed
in removal proceedings, and applies for adjustment of status.7 1 The FBI
and INS have classified information that, they believe, demonstrates that
the alien has joined a designated terrorist organization, and is thus ineligible for adjustment of status. Crucial to this belief is a tape of a phone call
in which the alien responds to a solicitation for membership by saying
softly-in Arabic-"tawakkaltala Allah." The FBI has translated this as: "I
have made my decision. I put my fate in God's hands." Further, the FBI
has reached the conclusion that this statement demonstrates that the alien
accepted the invitation to join the group. The INS seeks to introduce, as
classified evidence, statements by a supervising FBI agent detailing the
72
investigation and its conclusions.
The immigration judge would face a series of challenges in ascertaining the reliability and trustworthiness of this proffer. First, the immigration judge would face the problem of hearsay. Presumably, there are other
people at the FBI who have personal experience with this investigation: the
person who recorded the phone call, the person who believes that the voice
uttering the crucial words belongs to the alien in question, the person who
transcribed the Arabic phrase as "tawakkalt ala Allah," the person who
translated this phrase into English, and the person who analyzed the
phrase (either in Arabic or English) and concluded that it demonstrated an
intent to join the terrorist group. Even if these people (of course, the same
person may have performed multiple tasks) provide evidence directly, the
70. Operating Policy and Procedures Memorandum 98-10: Classified Information

in Immigration Court Proceedings (Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, 1998) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/ocij/OPPMLG2.htm.
71. The details of this hypothetical are drawn loosely from the investigation into the
crash of EgyptAir 990 as described in William Langewiesche, The Crash of EgyptAir 990,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 2001, at 41.

72. David Cole argues that one of the chief problems with the classified evidence
cases brought by INS is that "the INS has often relied on double and triple hearsay
assertions by FBI agents, and has refused to produce original declarants even when
asked to do so by the immigration judge." Cole, supra note 39, at 277.
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immigration judge would need to determine whether they were qualified to
reach their conclusions. With regard to the Arabic statement itself, the
immigration judge would face a best evidence problem over whether the
government needs to introduce the recording itself, a transcript, a summary, the analytical end-product, or some combination of the above. Suppose further that the government's translation of the phrase is suspect and
that other Arabic experts might translate "tawakkalt ala Allah" variously as:
"Iput my faith in God," "I rely on God," or "I depend in my daily affairs on
the omnipotent Allah alone."
Varying the facts slightly introduces another dilemma, namely the use
of non-FBI sources or informants. Suppose that, instead of a recording of
the key conversation, the FBI relied on a human source reporting the conversation. The immigration judge might then face the need for the protection of such a source, while also harboring concerns about the possibility
of bias or fabrication. Consider, for example, the possibility that the
source might be a former spouse actively pursuing a custody battle with
73
the alien.
How then should an immigration judge proceed? Should the immigration judge create for each case a set of approaches designed to ensure that
only those pieces of classified information that bear indicia of reliability
come into evidence? Alternatively, is it possible to articulate some standard that could generally guide an immigration judge through multiple
cases? The general standard certainly seems preferable to ensure uniformity, to promote efficiency, and to channel judicial review. Fortunately, the
problems confronting the immigration judge in the above hypothetical all
seem answerable with resort to the Federal Rules of Evidence and estab74
lished case law.
An immigration judge could address the problems flowing from the
tape recording by applying, inquisitorially, the federal evidentiary rules on
hearsay, best evidence, expert witnesses, and the corresponding case law.
Such an approach, while imperfectly tailored to a non-adversarial immigration proceeding seems preferable to the creation of a new body of stan73. See Kiareldeen, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 416-17 (detailing Kiareldeen's assertions that
his ex-wife served as the FBI's source against him in order to seek revenge after a bitter
divorce).
74. Scholars and administrative lawyers have long debated the merits of mandating
the use of the Federal Rules of Evidence in all Administrative proceedings. See, e.g.,
Michael Graham, Application of the Rules of Evidence in Administrative Agency Formal
Adversarial Adjudications: A New Approach, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 353 (1991.) (detailing
the Department of Labor's evidentiary rules); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Use of the Federal
Rules of Evidence in FederalAgency Adjudications, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (1987) (reporting
the recommendation of the Administrative Conference that Congress should not mandate the use of the Federal Rules of Evidence, but that agencies should adopt their own
evidentiary regulations). This article does not wade into the middle of this debate, but
instead argues for the use of the federal rules of the limited purpose of efficiently screening classified information for reliability and trustworthiness in absence of adversarial
testing. Notably, the use of the federal rules in this special context should not change
the long-standing rule that the formal evidentiary rules do not apply in immigration
proceedings. See, e.g., Navarrette-Navarrette v. Landon, 223 F.2d 234, 237 (9th Cir.
1955); In re Devera, 16 1. & N. Dec. 266, 268-69 (B.I.A. 1977).
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dards on a case by case basis. As explained, the immigration judge has the
subpoena tool available to facilitate any inquisitorial inquiry into the application of these standards.
This approach is not free from problems, however. It remains unlikely
that the immigration judge could ever learn of alternate possible translations without adversarial, non-classified proceedings. Without the ability
to bring in experts from outside the FBI, or more generally, experts without
security clearance, the immigration judge might not find out that reasonable alternate translations exist. Perhaps the best to be hoped for is simply
an inquisitorial testing of any experts with questions such as: "Is your
translation the only possible one?" or "Are there other translators at the FBI
who might differ regarding the translation?" Similarly, the immigration
judge could be stymied by a biased human source who dishonestly refuses
to disclose a conflict of interest. Again, the only resort might be inquisitorial questions concerning the source's relationship to the alien.
These limitations, however, do not diminish the vast improvement
over either a standardless approach to the admission of classified evidence,
or even an approach based only on the vague concept of fairness. The
Federal Rules of Evidence offer operational definitions for particular kinds
of evidence deemed reliable and trustworthy. While administrative law has
generally eschewed the need for such rigid standards, they seem appropriate to the unusual context of classified information because the non-adversarial nature of the process and the need for some structure to guide the
immigration judge. Moreover, the use of the federal rules provides exactly
the kind of formalized procedural due process needed to counterbalance
the loss of notice of the particulars and the opportunity to be heard.
Ultimately, this long-winded description of the new role for the immigration judge has a brief conclusion: the immigration judge should assess
the reliability of any proffered classified evidence by employing the Federal
Rules of Evidence in an inquisitorial manner and by admitting only those
pieces of evidence allowed under the Rules. Such an approach would provide considerable procedural due process protection for the alien. It would
ensure that any classified evidence conformed to a uniform standard of
admissibility. 75 Concededly, it would not test that evidence as rigorously
as, or with the perspective of, the adversarial process. Nevertheless, by
assuming an inquisitorial role, rather than merely an adjudicative role, the
immigration judge would provide a surrogate for the alien. 76 By employing the Federal Rules of Evidence, the immigration judge would provide the
alien with the protection of formal procedures to ensure the reliability and
75. Should the government refuse to produce original declarants when ordered to do
so by the immigration judge, then the immigration judge should just refuse to admit the
underlying information into evidence. See generally David Cole, Secrecy, Guilt By Association, and the Terrorist Profile, 15 J.L. & RELIGION 267 (2001-02).
76. Accordingly, this proposal would correct one of the most salient deficiencies of
the current system-the lack of any incentive for the INS to test their own sources rigorously. See id. at 277 ("Attorneys who know that their evidence cannot be challenged by
their adversaries have less incentive to test their sources to determine whether they have
the truth, as the allegations will not be subjected to testing in court.").
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trustworthiness of any classified evidence. 7 7
Critique
A critique of this proposal could take several forms. First, one could ask
whether it adequately balances the government's interest in national security with the critics' concern for civil liberties. From the government's perspective, the expanded role for the immigration judge means intense
scrutiny of national security information and analysis by a magistrate. The
process holds the potential for consuming significant resources and requiring the testimony of investigators, analysts, and possibly non-government
sources. Even though the proposal leaves the possibility of using classified
evidence intact, the government might view it as too burdensome, especially given scarce resources in the war on terrorism. 78 From the critics'
perspective, the situation is, perhaps, even worse. Nothing in the proposal
directly addresses the core concern that the consideration of undisclosed
evidence by the immigration judge deprives the alien of the traditional due
process protections of notice and the opportunity to be heard. Although
the inquisitorial role of the immigration judge and the heightened standards of the Federal Rules of Evidence may provide some offsetting effect,
the critics may well feel that these small measures hardly balance the loss
of a fully adversarial hearing.
Notably, the proposal advanced in this essay brings the procedures
attending the use of classified evidence during the consideration of an
application for discretionary relief closer to the standard established by the
ATRC. Although the ATRC accords a resident alien a surrogate attorney
empowered to examine and challenge proffered classified evidence, it disallows the use of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In other words, by creating
the position of special attorney, the ATRC attempts to provide certain
aliens with notice and an opportunity to be heard. Although the inquisitorial model advanced in this essay does not take the same step as the ATRC,
it attempts to compensate by raising the bar for the admission of evidence.
As such, this essay attempts to move the process away from the model
established by expedited removal proceedings, in which the government's
classified evidence undergoes no formal testing at all. Although this proposal fails to satisfy the intrinsic values of procedural due process, it does
take a significant step toward placing this particular use of classified evi77. This proposal could become reality on several paths, however unlikely. A federal
court could reach the same conclusion upon consideration of an appropriate case. Of
course, Congress could adopt the concept by statute. Alternately, the Department of
Justice could enact regulations. Less obviously, perhaps, the Board of Immigration
Appeals could adopt the proposal in a precedent decision pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g).
As the Supreme Court has held, the Board has the authority to interpret the immigration
statutes and federal courts must accord such interpretations Chevron deference. See INS
v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999).
F.3d___, 2003 WL 60109, *15 (4th Cir. Jan. 8, 2003)
78. Cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
(rejecting a probing hearsay analysis of governmental declaration in order to preserve
proper judicial deference to the executive's national security and war powers).
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dence more firmly on the instrumentalist path. 79
More importantly, perhaps, is the question of whether the immigration judge's inquisitorial application of the Federal Rules of Evidence
would allow the classified information process to survive constitutional
due process scrutiny (presuming the government lost its arguments concerning Jay and the lack of any protected interest in an application for a
discretionary benefit). In other words, could the proposal survive scrutiny
under the Mathews v. Eldridge test? Even if, in the abstract, the use of classified evidence could pass Mathews, the Supreme Court has set, as the bare
minimum of procedural due process, the fundamental due process protections of notice 80 and the opportunity to be heard. 8 1 On the other hand, in
his seminal work on the parameters of a fair hearing, Judge Friendly
offered that, should an agency be provided more process in one area, then
of another aspect of traditional due process might be
the elimination
82
conceivable.
Of the eleven attributes of a fair hearing identified by Judge Friendly,
the alien retains five in a proceeding involving undisclosed classified evidence: the right to an unbiased tribunal, the right to a record, the right to a
decision on the record, a statement of the reasons for such a decision, and
judicial review. 83 Because of the use of classified evidence, the remaining
rights are eliminated or abridged: the right to notice of the grounds for the
action, the right to present reasons against the action, the right to call witnesses, the right to know the evidence against one, the right to counsel,
and the right to a proceeding open to the public. 8 4 The essential question
is whether the expanded inquisitorial role of the immigration judge, coupled with rigorous evidentiary standards, compensates for the loss or
abridgment of these traditional due process rights.8 5 The strongest argument for the constitutionality of the practice is that the alien possesses
only an attenuated interest in discretionary benefits, even if the alien reasonably expects the opportunity to apply meaningfully for such relief. Further, the government's interest emanates from both immigration and
national security, two areas in which judicial deference is particularly
appropriate. 86 Ultimately, however, because of the essential nature of
notice and the opportunity to be heard, the Supreme Court may simply
need to carve out a categorical exception for classified evidence presented
79. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
80. See Memphis Light, Gas, & Water v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1978); Brock v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1987).
81. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985); Memphis
Light, 436 U.S. at 17-19; Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975).
82. HenryJ. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279 (1975).
83. See id. at 1279-95.
84. See id.
85. See also Michael Scaperlanda, Are We That Far Gone?: Due Process and Secret
Deportation Proceedings, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 23. 29-30 (1996) (concluding that the
ATRC serves as a model in exactly this sort of balancing by following Judge Friendly's
advice and "replacing the lost procedures with other powerful reinforcements.").
86. See Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424.
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in immigration proceedings.8 7
A more general objection to the proposal might focus on the constellation of public, as opposed to individual, problems created by allowing the
government to make decisions in secret. In other words, even if the individual received some kind of adequate process, would it undermine public
trust to allow such a procedure or would it lead to corrosive cynicism?8 8
Based on the view that procedural due process has essential intrinsic value,
the danger would seem great. In contrast, if due process is widely understood as an instrumental good, rather than an intrinsic one, then an open
and vibrant public debate over whether to allow the use of classified evidence would seem desirable.
As explained earlier, a meaningful debate requires more than an analysis of which all-or-nothing argument should prevail. Indeed, a polarized
debate, with no possibility of compromise, seems ripe for the production of
cynicism in a democracy. From this perspective, the central advantage of
the proposal advanced in this essay is that it moves beyond polemical discourse favoring either the government or civil libertarians. As such, it
offers the public an opportunity to balance otherwise mutually exclusive
visions.

87. This exception could take the form of a deviation from the traditional requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard in the limited context of classified evidence
proceedings, or it could entail a test for constitutional due process that strikes the balance in a significantly different manner than the Mathews test in recognition of the special considerations attendant at the intersection of immigration law and national
security. See Weiss, 510 U.S. at 177-78 (discussing the special due process test for analysis of procedures adopted under Congress' plenary power over the military).
88. For an analysis of cynicism and the importance of transparent government, see
generally Jonathan R. Macey, Cynicism and Trust in Politics and ConstitutionalTheory, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 280 (2002).

